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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
RICHARD JACQUES, by and
through his g u a r d i an, ad litem,
Pauline Murphy,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
D ALL AS F ARRIMOND, by and
through his guardian .ad litem, Thomas Smith Farrimond and THOMAS
~MITH F ARRIMOND, personally,
Defendants-R.espondents.

Case No.
9724

RESPONDEN'TS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an .action by plaintiff against defendant,
under the guest statute, to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained in a one car accident.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to the jury on special inte~r
rogatories on wlrieh the jury found that defendant was
guilty of intoxication and wilful misconduct, both of
which contributed to cause the accident, and further
found that the plaintiff was guilty of assumption of risk.
The trial court entered judgment on: the verdict in favor
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of defendants, no caus.e of action. Plaintiff's motion
for new trial, or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, was denied.
RELIEF SOUGH'T ON APPEAL
Respondents seek .an affirmance o.f the judgment
below.
SrTATEMEN T OF FAOT8
1

The statements of facts contained in appellant's
brief is wholly inadequate to inform the court as to the
background out of which the case arises, or as to the
evidence upon which the jury's findings were bas.ed.
There was conflicting evidence relative to each of the
issues of fact submitted to the jury for determination.
Because we admit that the· findings of the jury relative
to intoxication and wilful misconduct on the part of the
defendant are supported by competent evidence, and we
raise· no issue on those questions he·re, we do not detail
the evidence in support thereof. Likewise, under familiar
principles, the jury's finding that plaintiff assumed the
risk must be affirmed if supported by substantial and
competent evidence. It is not necessary to review all of
the evidence, but simply that which supports the jury's
findings, which was abundant.
In this brief, we shall refer to the parties as they
appeared in the court below. The word "defendant" refers to the defendant driver, Dallas Farrimond, except
where specifically indicated differently.
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Plaintiff .and defendant, and five of their comrades
were involved in an accident on the evening of January
-l, 1961. (R. 122, 148, 177, 217 244.) These seven high
sc-hool aged boys were close personal friends, "ran
around" together almost continuously, and it was their
enstom to go driving around .almost every evening. (R.
l:j:~. 25-!, 260, 339-340). Although only teen-aged, none
of them were strangers to the use of alcohol. (R. 139,
];)9, 1():2, 188-9, 196, 229, 252, 317, 344, 348). All of them
admitted that they had used alcohol; that they had seen
other members of the party use alcohol on other occasions, .and that they knew and understood the effects of
alcohol on the human body. (R. 139, 162, 163, 188, 189,
196, 230, 252-253, 344, 348). Plaintiff admitted on cross.examination that he knew and understood the effects of
alcohol on the human body, and specifically that he knew
it was not safe to ride in an automobile with someone
who had been drinking. (R. 252, 253).
On the evening of the accident, the defendant picked
up the other six boys, and after riding around awhile,
they went to the House of Pizza. (R. 122-123, 148, 177,
202, :218, 245, 316, 327, 341). The plaintiff was the first
of the passengers picked up by the defendant. (R. 12·2,
135, 177' 2-!5).
All seven boys testified at the trial, and all of them,
except Glen Ulmer, testified that there was no drinking
of alcoholic beverages prior to the time they arrived at
the House of Pizza. (R. 123, 136, 149, 157, 161, 177, 191,
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220, 227, 250, 326). IDmer testified that .although there
was no evidence that any of the boys had been drinking
prior to the time that they picked him up, there was a
]Jqttle passed around in the car, and there was drinking
during the time tha.t they drove out to Murray to pick up
Gorringe, and also on their return up to the time they
arrived at the House. of Pizza. (R. 341, 351-352).

Although plaintiff denied having anything to drink
on the evening of the accident, and denied knowledge of
any drinking by defendant, and in fa.ct denied seeing any
alcoholic beverages at all, (R. 2'46, 2,50), his te stimony
was contradicted by every other member of the party.
Several of the boys testified that one of their party,
Ligaros, obtained a one-fifth bottle, partly filled with
gin, from som.e acquaintances inside the House 'Of Pizz-a,
which he presented to the occupants. of the car. (R. 123,
124, 178, 187, 2·27). This was mixed with some mixer,
which the boys conveniently had available, and was consumed by plaintiff, defendant, and Ligaros. (R. 135,
178, 219, 228, 327, 332, 343, 351). Although Richard Rhead
did not actually see any part of the contents of the bottle
consumed, he did see the bottle, and assumed that some
of the boys dr.ank it, because that would he the usual
thing for them to do. (R. 162-163). There was no evidence that any of the other four drank any part of the
liquor, erxcept that one of the boys admitted that he
tasted it and didn't like it. (R. 150, 158, 228, 2.29, 343).
1

The boys remained at the House of Pizza. for approximately an hour. (R. 149, 158). During this time,
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hPsides engaging in what drinking they did, they talked
with some girls inside the· House of Pizza, (R. 202, 316,
379), and engaged in a dough fight amon'gst themselves;
and decor.ated the automobile of one of the girls with
dough. (R. 126, 136, 150, 196). Before they finally departed the House of Pizza, on the trip that resulted in
the accident, plaintiff and one of the other boys took
defendant's car and drove to Rhead'shome; (R. 181-182·,
195, ~31, 329). Another time plaintiff drove the car and
all seven of them rode around a few blocks, and then
came hack to the IIouse· of Pizza. (R. 19·6, 2.30, 329).
During this time defendant was sitting in the back s.eat..
(R. 230, 329-330). There was .also evidence that while defendant was in the House of Pizza talking to his girl
friend, the rest of the boys drove his car away but they
can1e back later and picked him up. (R. 32.2.-323, 382, 384).
1

Besides the testimony of plaintiff's own companions
as to his drinking, the.re was. testimony by two girls who
saw him inside the House of Pizz-a, to the effect that he
had been drinking, and that others of the boys had also
been drinking. (R. 317, 380, 381, 392, 39·3). The investigating officer detected the odor of ·alcohol on piaintif'f"s
breath while he was attempting to render first aid to him
at the scene of the accident. (R. 111).
There was testimony that the influence· of alcohol on
defendant was observed at the time the boys finally left
the House of Pizza. (R. 222-223, 230, 328, 343, 345, 352).
Dwight Tolley testified that defendant was ''acting
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goofy", and that he was "pretty drunk." (R. 223). IDmer
testified that he, was "pretty well gone," (R. 345), and
Gorringe testified that defendant and plaintiff were
messing around and that they were aoting the same.
(R. 328). Both were acting different from normal. (R.
328).
Although appellant claims that defendant was
angered by the fact that his girl friend wa~ at the House
of Pizza in another boy's. car, and suspected that she
intended to marry him, the: record citations in appellant's
brief do not support the claim. In faet, the,re is very little
evidence in the record to sustain it, principally the testimony of plaintiff"s mother and stepfather, that at the
hospital defendant said in their presence, that he had a
fight with his girl friend. (R. 257, 2?1). However, both
defendant and his girl friend denied that there had been
.a fight or argument of any kind, or that defendant was in
any way upset. (R. 180, 315-316). The testimony was
also refuted by defendant's parents. (R. 372-373, 401,
.411). None of his companions noticed his being upset or
anything unusual, and none of them was aware of any
trouble between defendant a.nd his girl friend. (R. 216,
263, 365, 367). There' was considerable evidence that he
was happ~, gay and having a good time. (R. 203, 205,
230, 231, 328).
In summary, the jury found that defendant was intoxicated, ·and that his intoxication was a cause of the
accident. (R. 81-83, 45~6-457, 461-462). There is abundant
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evidence that all of the drinking which defendant did on
th~ evening of the' .accident, was done· after he picked up
the plaintiff (R. 123, 136, 149, 157, 161, 177, 191, 220, 227,
250, 326) ; that all of the drinking done: by defendant was
d..one in the presence of the plaintiff (R. 191, 220, 236};
that plaintiff was fully aware of the drinking done by
defendant .and was aware of the effect that the drinking
would have on defendant (R. 191, 220, 252-253); that
plaintiff had on previous occasions seen defendant when
he had been consuming alcoholic beverages (R. 252};
that plaintiff imbibed equally with the defendant and
participated freely and equally with him in the pleasures
of the evening (R. 135, 178, 191, 2:19, 228, 327, 332., 343,
351); that the effects of the alcohol upon defendant we-re
obvious and were observed before the time the boys. left
the House of Pizza (R. 222, 223; 230, 328, 343, 345, 352);
that there were four boys in the car that had had nothing
whatsoever to drink and· were fit and able to drive, hut;
none of them offered to drive or insisted upon driving
(R. 150, 158, 228, 229, 343); that the House of Pizza from
which the party departed was a ''hangout'' for teenagers,
where they met their friends, and where it may be fairly
assumed none of them would have any difficulty in ob-,
taining .a ride from another friend, if they did not care
to ride with defendant in his then condition.. The evidence was that the other boys felt free to take defendant's car and that they did in fact do so. (R. 181-182,
195,.1~6, 230-231, 329). There is also abundant evidence
that at no time i~ the course of the ride did plaintiff in
any,Yise protest the manner in which defendant was
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driving, nor did he ask to he let out of the car. (R. 131,
232, 330, 331, 346, 347). On the contra.ry, when the other
boys requested the defendant to slow down, plaintiff exhorted him to go faste-r. (R. 191, 330, 346, 369). Not
only was the jury's finding of assumption of risk ampJy
supported by the evidence, hut the evidence would hardly
permit any other inference.
It should also be noted that neither at the time the
case was submitted to the jury, nor at ,any subsequent
time, did plaintiff ever take exception to the verdict
forms, or to the submission of the case to the jury on
special interrogatories..

ARGUMENT'
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK, TO THE JURY ON SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES.

Rule 49, specfically authorizes the submission of
issues of fact to the jury on special verdicts in the form
of special written interrogatories on each issue of fact,
rather than upon a general verdict :
"'The court may require a jury to return only
a special verdict in the form of a special written
finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the
court may submit to the jury written interrogatories susceptible of categorical or other brief
answer or may submit mitten forms of the
several special findings which might properly be
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1nade under the pleadings .and evidence; or it
may use such other method of submitting the
issues and requiring the written findings thereon
as it deems most appropriate. * * *"
Where a rase is submitted on special findings it then
becomes the duty of the court to apply the law to the
detmmined facts and direct the appropriate judgment.
~Pe Rule 58 A :

"* * * If there is a special verdict ... pursuant to rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith signed
by the clerk and filed."
The use of special interrogatories w.a.s not an innovation of the new rules, nor was it a stranger to our code
practice. On the . contrary, this procedural device has
been used through the history of the state, extending.
back into territorial days. Its use has been known to the
common law for centuries. It has uniformly been held
that whether the case should be submitted to the jury on
a general verdict, or on a special verdict, or on a general
verdict with special interrogatories, is a matter within
the sole discretion of the trial court, and in the absence
of a sho·wing of an abuse of discretion, the losing party.
has no grolmd of appeal. 53 Am. Jur. 736-7, Trial§ 1064.
See .also 5 :Moore's Federal Practice 2204, § 49.03:
•'lTnder Rule -!9 (a) the court has complete
discretion as to \Yhether a special or general verdict is to be returned. As with othe'r discretionary
acts, this should not be reviewable, except, perhaps, for gross abuse, which could rarely be
shown."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

In Smith vs. Ireland, 4 Ut. 187, 7 P. 749, the territorial court said :
"It was within the· discretion of the court to
direct a general or special veTdict, or special as
to the controverted facts and general -as to those
not controve·rted on the trial.''
That rule has been consistently followed since that
time. Se e Mangum v. Bullion Beck & Champion Min. Co.,
15 Ut. 34, 50 P. 834, and Genter v. Conglomerate Min. Co.,
23 Ut. 165, 64 P. 362.
1

In Prye v. Kalbaugh, 34 Ut. 306, 97 P. 331, this court
said:
"We think under the statute it w,as within the
discretion of the court to submit or refuse to
submit the particular questions of fact requested,
and that error cannot be imputed to the trial court
without a showing of an abuse of discretion."
See .also Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Smart
Land & Livestock Co., 43 Ut. 554, 137 P. 837, and Berg v.
Otis Elevator Co., 64 Ut. 518, 231 P. 832.
A more recent case is Baker v. Cook, 6 Ut.2d 161,
here~, the losing party made no
objection or exception to the submission of the case to
the jury on special interrogatories, or to the form of the
questions. 'There, as here, complaint was made to thereviewing court for the first ti1ne. The language of this
court in that case is singularly applicable here:

308 P .2:d 264. There, as
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''But defendant neither objected nor excepted
to the form of questions and counsel cannot sit
back and permit the court to submit the propositions and object if the verdict is unfavorable.
• • • After the case was submitted the jury returned to ask the court what would happen if
they answered 'yes' in both questions 1 und 2.
Neither before the jury was charged, nor in the
exceptions taken after the jury left to deliberate,
nor when the jury came in for further instructions, did defendant suggest that the propositions
were confusing and should be clarified. Never
until the proposition was pres,ented to this court
was it urged that the propositions were confusing.
If the defendant felt that the questions were so
drawn as to confuse the jury, request should
have been made to clarify the questions, particularly when the jury came back to see what
would happen if they answered questions 1 and
2, 'ye~s'."
And in apparently the most recent expression on the
subject, this court said in Ranks v. Chr~stensen, 11 Ut. 2d
8, 35± P. 2d 564:
"It is elementary that there is no impropriety
in submitting special interrogatories if the court
so desires."
Plaintiff has cited not a single case or text to support his contention that the court erred in submitting the
ease to the jury on special interrogatories. He has
quoted from the record as to certain conversations between the court and members of the jury before the
verdict was finally received. Although he now complains
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as to the special interrogatories, he: did not at that time
by motion, objection, exception, or otherwise, indicate to
the court that he had any objection whatsoever to the
manner in which the court proceeded. No abuse of discretion has been shown. AppeHant's first point is entirely
without merit.
POINT II.
BY PARTICIPATING WITH THE DEFENDANT IN
THE DRINKING OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, AND BY
RIDING WITH HIM WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
LIQUOR THAT HE HAD CONSUMED, PLAINTIFF VOLUNTARILY ASSUMED THE RISK OF ANY MISHAP RESULTING FROM DEFENDANT'S INTOXICATED CONDITION.

Plaintiff apparently contends that one may freely
and without penalty elect to ride with a driver known to
have been drinking and obviously physically impaired to
drive, and after having done so, to .assess against the
driver any loss sustained by the rider as a result of the
driver's own impaired condition. Such clearly is not and
never has been the law.
In 5 A Am. J ur., page 739, Automobiles, Sec. 792,
the rule is stated as follows:
''Reason and authority alike support the· rule
that i'f a person voluntarily rides in an .automobile
driven by one who is intoxicated, and whom the·
passenger knows, or, under the circumstances,
should have known was intoxicated, he is precluded from recovering from the driver for injuries sustained in .an accident if the intoxicated
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condition of the driver was the proximate cause
or one of the proximate causes of the accident in
which the plaintiff was injured. * * * The cases
which have applied the doctrine of .assumption of
risk to guest actions hold that where· the guest had
knowledge, or should know, of the intoxicated
condition of the driver, then. the guest is deemed
to have assumed the risk of riding with his host.''
See also -! BlashfiJeld, Cyclopedia of Automobile La.w
and Pra.ctice, Sec. 2512, p. 716:
"Likewise, one voluntarily riding with a
drunken driver assumes the risk arising from
such driving, especially where the guest voluntarily becomes intoxicated himself."
See also 2 H.arper and J,ames, the Law of Torts,
page 1171, and Restatement of Torts §§ 482(2) and
§ 503(2). ·The same rule is stated in the principal authority cited .and relied upon by appellant, 44 A. L. R. 2d
13-!2, 1343 :
"To the extent that the doctrine of 'assumption of risk' has been accepted as .a defense in
other than master-and-servant or other contract
situations, 1nost of the courts have held that a
guest who voluntarily assumes the risk of injury
from his host's wilful or wanton misconduct, gross
negligence, or intoxication, cannot recover for
the injuries to the infliction of which he has, in
effect, assented."
The rules as stated by the textwriters are fully supported by the decisions.
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In House v. Schmelzer, (Cal. App.), 40 P.2d 577, the
court said at page 579:
''While an innocent person is entitled to protection from intoxicated drivers and to redress
for injuries caused by them, one who accepts a
ride under drcumst,ances which should be a sufficient warning to any reasonable person that the
.driver is not in a fit condiJtion to operate his car
has no just c.ause fo!r compZaimt when the law
leaves him where he f't'nds himself." (Emphasis
ours.)
The court of last resort o.f the State of Kentucky,
the home of Bourbon vVhiskey, has, as might be antici·pated, had occasion to treat the problem here involved in
many cases. That court, apparently fully acquainted with
the frequent results of mixing gasoline and alcohol, has
consistently and repeatedly affirmed the general principle that one who elects to ride with a driver known to
have been drinking to ·a substantial extent, is barred
fron1 reeovery if an accident ensues resulting in whole or
in part from the driver's impaired condition. One of the
earliest decisions was in the case of Winston's AdmirtiJstrator v. City of Henderson, 179 Ky. 2.20, 200 SW 330,
where the court said .at p. 332 of 200 S.W.:
"Winston and Nunnelly were associated together for some hours o:ri the evening of the aooident, and had been in and about restaurants and
saloons. together. . . Winston was fully acquainted
with Nunnelly's intoxicated condition if he was
intoxicated; he knew all of the facts or·had the
opportunity of knowimg them before he entered
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the car, and is therefore charged with that
knowledge. • • '"'" (Emphasis ours.)
The principles there laid down have been consistently followed. In Rennold's A.dmtnistratrix v. Waggener, 271 Ky. 300, 111 S.W. 2d 647, the court said at
page 649 of 111 SW2d:
"It is an established rule in this jurisdiction
that a person who enters an automobile as a guest
with knowledge that the driver is intoxicated to
an extent that renders him careless or indifferent
to his own safety or the safety of others, or incompetent to properly operate the automobile, is
guilty of contributory negligence·, and that the
guest assumes the risks tncident to the oper,ation
of the automobile by a dn'ver in such condition.
"It has been a subject of comment by this
court that as a matter of common knowledge the
use of intoxicants begets a spirit of recklessness
and that their use to an .appreciable degree of
intoxication so disturbs the normal volitional and
reflex powers as to render a driver of an automobile inc.apable of responding with the precision,
judgment, and accuracy necessary to a proper and
safe operation of an automobile.'' (Emphasis
ours.)
In JJfakin'.s Adm'r. v. J.l!IcLelland, 279 Ky. 59·5, 131
S.W.2d 478, the court said:
"The principal controversy before us involves the question as to whether or not Jessie
Makin knew that McLellan was drnnk when she
entered his car. If she did, she ·assumed the risk
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when she got in the car to ride into Louisville
with McLellan.''
To the same effect see Toppass v. Perkt"ns, 268 Ky.
186, 104 SW2d 423; Spt"vey's Admtnistratrix v. Hackworth, 304 Ky. 141, 200 SW2d 131; Spencer v. Boes, 305
Ky. 573, 205 SW2d 150; Irby v. Williams, 313 Ky. 353,
231 SW2d 1; LewiJs v. Perkins, 313 Ky. 847, 233 SW2d
985 and J(avanaugh v. Myers' Administratrix, (Ky.),
246 SW2d 461.
Another court which has had frequent occasion to
pass on the same problem is that of Louisiana. In
Richa.rd v. Canning, (La. App.), 158 So. 598, 599, that
court used language singularly appropriate to the case
at bar:
''Canning's condition must have been ohv:ious.
He a'YIAd Richard had been together for several
hours, and though, at the various homes at which
they had visited, they may have been separated
for a few moments, they were suffiJC'Vently together for Richard to have become fully aware
of the fact that his friend was imbibimg freely
of intoxicating liquors." (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of Mercier v. FiJdelity & Casualty Company of New York, (L.a. App.), 10 So. 2d 262, 264, the
court said:
"They [plaintiff and defendant] drank freely
and continuously, each to the knowledge of the
other, and both knew that they were under its
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
influPneP. . . Plaintiff had enough experience in
life to discern when one was sober, or under the
influence of liquor, .and was thus able to appreciate danger and risk of continuing to drink and
over-indulge with one whom he knew would operate the automobile in returning to their homes.
He knew, or should have known, that by excessive drinking, Furey would be deprived of his
normal f,aculties and be unable to exercise the
ordinaffy care and oaut~on possessed by one when
sober. H,e knew, or should have known, all of the
[,acts, and had full opportwmity of knowing them
before continuing with his revelry. TheiJr cont,i.n.ued drinktng was of ,sufficient importance to
ca,nse an apprehension of d~anger and an .anticiJp(J)tion and realizatvon of the peril in which he was
voltttntwrily entering.· One cannot close his eyes
to obvious danger, or entrust his s,afety absolutely to the driver of an ,automobile when the same
knowledge of obvious or thre1atened danger is
possessed by both. Experiencing the exhiliration
. and sensations incident to the swirl and dash of
a 1nixture of intoxicating liquor and rapid transit, plaintiff assumed the risks of ,danger attendant
thereto.* * *" (Emphasis ours.)
And in Elba v. Thom.as, (La. App.), 59 So. 2d 732,
736, the same court said :
''This court can take judicial notice of what
i::-: common knowledge and human experience.

Anyone who has indulged in alcoholic beverages
kno-ws that it dulls perception ·and reflexes to
the extent that one cannot react normally to impending emergencies and dangers.''
To the same effect: Livaudai.s v. Black, (La.. App.),
127 So.129; CHnton v. City of West Mon.roe, (La. App.),
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187 So. 561; Will~s v. City of West Monroe, (La. App.),
187 So. 829; Madden v. City of West Monroe, (La. App.),
187 So. 829; and Perritt v. City of West Monroe, (La.
App.), 187 So. 830.
In Aycock v. Green, (Tex. Civ. App.), 94 SW2d 894,
898, the· court said :
"The: record at large', raises the constantly
recurring question of whether a willing and active participant, such as the decedent in this case,
can be heard to complain of fortuitous circumstances occurring to him in an escapade of this
nature, in which all the participants join, delihe·rately and voluntarily, with equal zest and with
full knowledge of its possibilities for an unhappy
ending. Our courts have many times held, with
obvious reason, that in such cases a victim of the
folly (or his unfortunate survivors) cannot recover of his fellow whom he had joined wholeheartedly in producing the very result which all
had equal opportunity of foreseeing and avoiding."
To the same effect see Sclviller v. Rice, ('Tex.), 246
SW2d 607, and Mooneyhan v. Benedict, (Tex. Civ. App.),
284 SW2d 741.
In Hicks v. Herbert, 173 Tenn. 1, 113 SW2d 1197,
1199, the court said in a case .analogous to the one at bar:

"It was not necessary for the defendant,
relying on plaintiff's contributory negligence, to
prove actual knowledge of defendant's intoxication on the part of plaintiff. If an ordinarily
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prudent man under the circumstances w~e have
related would have regarded defendant as mtoxicated and appredated h~ condition, such
knowleJdge and appreciation must be imputed to
pla~ntvff.

"Plarmtiff was in a position to see just as
much of defendant and of defend,ant's condition
as were the other witnesses test~fyilng in the
case ...
''We think the record discloses a case· in
which it appears 'that reasonable men, acting as
the triers. of the fact, would find, without any
reasonable probability of differing in their views,
either that the plaintiff lmew and appreciated
the danger or that ordinarily prudent men, under
the same circumstances would readily acquire
such knowledge and appreciation. . . ' " (Emphasis ours.)
Se'e also Schwartz v. J olvnson, 152 Tenn. 586, 280
32.

~\V2d

A leading case from Iowa is Garrity v. Mangan,
(Ia.), 6 NW2d 292. The court there said .at p. 295:

"Although the distinction has been made by
our courts at various times, it seems to us reasonable ·and clear that one who enters a car .as a
guest, lmowing that the driver is under the influence of intoxicating liquor should be deemed
to take his chances of an accident and resulting
injury, .and such has been the holding of various
courts.
"In the instant case, under the evidence, the
fact remains that defendant's decedent was either
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intoxicated or he was not. If not, there would be
rio cause of action. Under the uncontradicted
evidence, if he was 2'ntox~cated it must have been
obviJous to his companion, who was with h2m all
the evening previous to the .accident. .. ; the doctrine of assumption of r~k would .apply, and Vt
would be held ~as a matter of law that the plaintiff's decedent assumed the risk of riding wt"th a
drunken dr:ive.r. In either event, there could be
no recovery." (E.mphasis ours.)
In Booth vs. General Mills, 243 Ia. 206, 49 NW2d 561,
the· same court said :
"It is appellant's claim that .at the time plaintiff entered defendant's car, just shortly before
the fatal accident, he knew or should have known
that Shocklee w.as intoxicated. Where the facts
clearly show such a situation, there can be no
recovery . . ."'
Se:e also HelmiJng v. People's National Bank, (Ia.),
220 NW 45.
In the· West Virginia case of Hurt v. Gwimm, 95 SE2d·
248, 251, the court s.aid:
''The evidence before us leaves no doubt
that the three persons who took the drive in defendant's automobile ... to the place where the
accident occurred, had been drinking intoxicating
liquor prior to the commencement of the drive,
each havtng knowlBdge of the drtnking by the
others . .. It is not questioned that each of the
three voluntarily entered into the venture of the
drive .and the hazards thereof. . . It cannot be
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doubted in such circumstances, that each of the
parties was fully cognizant of the hazards of
such a dr.ive from the time of commenc:ement
thereof. A guest passenger voluntarily following
such a course of known hazardous conduct,
fraught with strong possibility of the very type
of the accident which occurred, cannot be permitted to recover merely because she had no opportunity to escape injury after the accident
began to take place - in the instant case after
the automobile of defendant began to skid." (Emphasis ours.)

In Stekovich v. U. 8., (M.D. Pa), 102 F. Supp. 925,
926, the court said :
"Where a passenger .accompanies the driver
of an automobile, knowing of the driver's drimkiu,rJ, and is injured through negligence of the
driver, brought about by the alcohol he has taken,
such passenger assumes the risk of voluntarily
riding vdth him." (Emphasis ours.)

In Taylor v. Taug, (Wash.), 136 P.2d 175, the Supreme Court of \Vashington said at page 180:
"That the drinking of intoxicating liquor
effectually destroys the faculties essential to safe
driving is of such common knowledge that no one
with sense will submit to the peril of riding with
a driver who has recently consumed liquor. Anyone who submits to that peril assumes the riJsk
attendant upon the journey and is guilty of contributory negligence \Yhich precludes recovery.
Appellant was a high school gr:aduate and certainly must have appreciJated the danger of rid-
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ing iln a car driven by one whom she had jUst seen
drinklng ilntox:icattng liquor." (Emphasis ours.)
And in conclusion the court further said at p. 180:
"Rerri. Rev. Stat. Sec. 6.360-119', provides: 'It
shall he unlawful for any person to operate any
vehicle upon the public highway of this state
while under the influence of or affected by the
use of intoxic-ating liquor . . . "
"We have held that one driving in violation
of this statute is guilty of negligence per se ...
"By the same reasoning, we must hold that
one who voluntarily rides with such .a driver
assumes the risk of the venture· and contributes
to the injury. This conclusion is borne· out hy
the statement we have quoted from Parker v.
Taylor, supra. Th~s accident w.as simply the
af.termath of ,a drinking party, a;nd while appellant did not drink intoxicattng liquor, she cert.atnly knew that liquor w.as being consumed by
the driver and others Vn his company.
''We hold that appellarnt assumed the risk
(J)tten,aant upon the journey, and that she was
guilty of contributory negligence." (Emphasis·
ours.)
See to the some effeet Hemington v. Hemington, 221
Mich. 206, 190 NW 683.
In Packard v. Quesnel, 112 Vt. 175, 22 A2d 164, the
court said:

''Reason and authority alike support the rule
·that if a person voluntarily rides in an automobile
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driven by one who is intoxicated and the passenger knows, or under the' circumstances should have
known, the intoxicated condition of the driver, he
is precluded from recovering from such driver or
a third person for injuries sustained in an accident if the intoxicated condition of the driver was
the proximate cause or one of the proximate
rauses of the accident producing the injuries in
question. • • *''
In a recent case from Colorado, the Supreme Court
of that state said at p. 600 of 309' P.2d :
"From the facts herein related, which are undisputed, to the effect that plaintiff participated
in what we will call,a drinking party on the evening of the accident and imbibed freely from the
intoxicating liquor that was about her before
leaving on the trip during which the accident
occurred, that she went so far as to offer some of
her liquor to the driver, that she knew the driver
and her companions were in a state of intoxication before starting on the disastrous journey, it
is clear that plaintiff was contributorily negligent
and a.ssrttmed the risk of whatever might happen
"~hen she entered defendant's automobile with
the other intoxicated occupants and continued on
the trip in a party where sobriety was wholly
absent. The motion for a directed verdict bas.ed
upon the grounds just enumerated, should have
been sustained and error of the trial court attached.
"Plaintiff while legally a minor, was 19 years
old and possessed of the usual and ordinary
faculties of an adult person and it may be assumed that she was fully capable of knowing, or
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could anticipate, danger that might follow from
the operation of the car due to the physical incapacity of the driver, and she made no effort to
avoid the likelihood of the accident and it must he·
said ·that she assumed the risk, which bars her
recovery." (Emphasis. ours.) Hiller v. Gross,
(Colo.), 309 P.2d 598.
In the earlier case of United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Americ.a, Local Union No. 55 v.
Salter, (Golo.), 167 P.2d 9·54, the same court said:
"·The effect of intoxicating liquor in depriving a driver of care and caution and inducing
physical incapacity in the operation of a car is
universally known and tragically illustrated
almost daily. Where' one becomes a guest and imprudently enters a car with knowledge that the
driver is so· under the influence of intoxicants as
to tend to prevent him from exercising the care
and caution which a sober and prudent man would
employ in the operation and control of the car, the
guest is barred from recovery by reason of his
contributory negligence, and as having assumed
the risk involved. Where the evidence of such
fact is_ without conflict, plaintiff is barred from
recovery as a matter of law. * * * Where the
evidenc~ is. sufficient to raise a question as to
plaintiff's knowledge~ and prudence, the determination of that issue must be submitted to the
jury or other trier of facts.

"It is a matter of_ common knowledge, that
whatever may be the result in a particular case,
the drinking of intoxicating liquors generally inSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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creases the likelihood of negligent driving. Voluntarily becoming the guest of a driver who has
been drinking intoxicants is analogous to becoming the guest of an operator who is lrnown to have
been a negligent driver.
''Where the guest has knowledge of substantial drinking of intoxicating liquor by the driver
and there is evidence tending to show that such
drinking was a contributing cause of the driver's
negligence, then the issue as to whether the guest
was sufficiently forewarned so that under all the
circumstances he was negligent in becoming or
remaining a guest in the car should be submitted
to the jury. He is not barred as a matter of law
except where his knowledge of the physical incapacity of the driver and the surrounding circumstances are such that reasonable men could
draw but one inference as to his negligence.
* * * The issue, of assumption of risk should
have be,en submitted to the jury."
See also Franco v. Vakares, (Ariz.), 277 P. 812;
Smart r. Masker, (Fla.), 113 So. 2d 414; Hernng v.
Erland, (Fla.), 81 So. 2nd 645; William v. Owens, 85 Ga.
App. 549, 69 SE2d 787; Besserman v. Hines, 219 Ill. App.
606; K1·imse v. Chicago, T. H. & S. E. Ry. Co., 73 Ind.
App. 537, 127 N.E. 837; Saxton v. Rose, (Miss.), 29 So.2d
646; and Xardone v. Milton Fire Dist., 261 App. Div. 717,
:27 NYS 2d 489.
In nearly all of the above cases the appellate court
held, lmder the evidence, that as ,a matter of law plaintiff
was debarred from recovery. We believe that the facts
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of this cas.e are -equally strong, and that the trial court
would have been amply justified in granting defendant's
motion for dire'Cted verdict. However, it is not now
necessary to go that far. It is sufficient to hold that the
finding of the jury is supported by competent and substantial evidence.
The precise probJem does not appear to have been
previously pres,ented to this court. However, in Muligarn
v. Harward, 11 Ut. 2d 74, 355 P2d 62, this court indicated
by a strong dictum that it would follow the line of reasoning of the cases above quoted:
"Of course, if the plaintiff had known
Harward was intoxicated at the time they embarked on the journey, he would probably he in
the position of having assumed the risk."

A similar expression is found in the earlier case of
Balle v. Sm~th, (Ut.), 17 P.2d 2·2.4:
"Where one rides with an intoxicated driver,
or one who ... drives at .an excessive or unlawful
rate of speed, and the guest, with knowledge of
such condition of the driver or such negligent or
unlawful acts without objection continues to ride
in such automobile, and an accident happens
which is caused or contributed to by such negligence cannot recover.''
And in EserniJa v. Overland Moving Co., 120 Ut. 647,
206 P .2d 621, the same principle was applied to a plain-
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tiff who rode and continued to ride with a driver, known
by plaintiff to be in a sleepy condition. This court there
held as a matter of law that plaintiff was debarred
from recovery.
POINT III.
THERE WAS NO REVERSIBLE ERROR
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY.

IN

THE

Although plaintiff asserts prejudicial error in the
court's stock instruction to the jury, defining among
other things, negligence and contributory negligence,
counsel devotes only one short par:agraph to the· support
of this proposition and cites not a single authoritystatute, case or text, in support of his position. Therefore. the contentjon does not merit extensive treatment.
While it probably· would have been better had the
court omitted the instruction with reference to ordinary
negligence and con trihutory negligence, no harm could
possibly have come to either party, in view of the fact
that the ease was submitted to the jury upon special interrogatories, and the jury was specifically required to
find on the issues of intoxication, wilful misconduct, and
assumption of risk. Each of these doctrines was fully
explained to the jury in other instructions. The doctrine of wilful misconduct was further explained by the
court in response to a question put by the jury during
the course of its deliberations. It is inconceivable on the
record before the court, that the jury could have been
misled by the surplusage of instructions defining negli-
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gence and contributory negligence. We call the court's
attention to the provisions of R.ule 61, which reads as
follows:
"No error in either the admission or the excluion of evidence, and no error or defect in any
ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by
the court or by any of the parties, is ground for
granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such
action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in
the' proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties."
1

The reasoning of this court in the recent Utah case
of Hadley v. Wood, 9' Ut.2d 366, 345 P.2d 197, is applicable here. In that case the trial court withdrew from the
jury the issue· of contributory negligence by reason of
plaintiff's tender years. However, the court gave an
instruction to the jury to the effect that there could be
more than one legal cause of an accident, notwithstanding that such instruction had become irrelevant in view
of the withdrawal of the issue of contributory negligence
from the jury. In holding that the presentation of the
irrelevant instruction to the jury w.as harmless, this court
said:
·"Notwithstanding there is some justification
for the charge that irrelevant instructions were
given, if' they are viewed as. .a whole, as they
should be, the issues were presented to the jury
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fully and fairly and in such a manner that we see
no prejudice to the rights of the plaintiff."

CONCL,U8ION
There was no error the court below. The court acted
within the bounds of its discretion in submitting the case
case to the jury on special interrogatories and plaintiff
made no objection or exception thereto. The evidence
abundantly supports the jury's finding that plaintiff
vohmtarily assumed the risk in riding with a driver
whom he knew, or should have known, had imbibed a
sufficient amount of alcoholic beverage to become intoxicated. There was no prejudicial error in the instructions to the jury. The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

·CHRIBTE,N8EN ANDI JENS.EN
By RAY R. CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for R{3Jspondents

1205 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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